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Abstract 
 
In this working paper we report on two trust games: a BDM-like game which is 
interpreted through its use of the possibly suggestive words “show up fee,” “sends,” 
“tripled,” “send back”; and an uninterpreted spatial game that does not use these words 
suggestive or not.  In the spatial game we found a considerable amount of reciprocity, 
which implies the words are not necessary for reciprocity. 
     For further comparison we designed the two games to have a correspondence 
relation (the relation extends to the original BDM trust game).  We focused on two 
“variables” – interpreted or uninterpreted and spatial or word-based. We also designed  
“constants” which were identical or near identical in the two games.  We did this to 
reduce confounding in statistical comparisons. 
     We found the frequency of reciprocity in the spatial game, without the suggestive 
words, was about the same as the frequency of reciprocity in the BDM-like game, with 
the suggestive words.  We found iterated dominance in the spatial game was 5.5 times 
higher than in the BDM-like game.  And we found sending the full endowment was  
significantly more frequent in the BDM-like game than in the spatial game. 
1 The Original Trust Game: Success and Open Questions 
 
     In 1995 Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (BDM) pioneered the trust game, opening 
many paths of research: definitions of trust and trustworthiness, cross-country 
effects, effects of markets, effects on economic growth, effects of oxytocin (for 
effects of oxytocin on trust see Kosfeld, Michael, Markus Heinrichs, Paul Zak, Urs 
Fischbacher and Ernst Fehr, 2005).  In a forthcoming survey Wilson and Eckel 
found 84 trust game experiments, 140 unpublished papers on trust games, and 10 
additional replications of the original BDM game. 
 
      But some researchers have doubts.  Could the language of “send,” “send back” 
suggest reciprocal behavior?  Could these and other words be suggestive or value 
laden?  In efforts to achieve double-blind anonymity could some subjects draw 
conclusions about the need for anonymity (eg.“it’s okay to be selfish” or “the 
experimenters want us to act selfishly”)? 
 
     {Pages with a blue-green background are comments and analysis; pages in Arial 
font are instruction slides from the experiment or individual experiments.}  
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2 Purpose 




• We designed three games.  One game, a spatial game, called the Trapezoid game because of its 
shape, is uninterpreted and does not use the words “show up fee,” “sends,” “triples,” “sends back.”  
 
• The second game is interpreted and its interpretation is explained by the words “show up fee,” 
“sends,” “triples,” “sends back.”  We call this interpreted, non-spatial game “BDM-like.” By 
design, our BDM-like game emphasizes the words more than in the original trust game. 
 
• The third game is a hybrid with both the spatial and word-based features; its discussion is 
postponed for now. 
 
• We designed  “constants” which were identical or near identical in the three games. 
  
• We designed the games to achieve a correspondence relation between them.  
 
      The next pages are instruction slides showing the large reliance on graphics in the experiment 
and illustrate the above designs in the game forms, double-blind procedure, correspondence 
relation,  and the rest of the operationalization.  Full instructions and practice exercises for all three 
games are available on the website at:  http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Louis_Putterman/instructions.html  but 
omitted here because of time and space. 
   3 WELCOME TO AN EXPERIMENT  
ON DECISION MAKING 
Experimenters: 
     Professor Talbot Page 
     Professor Louis Putterman 
     Ken Ettinger, Undergraduate  
Please sit at a desk with a folded piece of paper  
taped to the desk (leave it taped for the moment) 
  
Please do not touch the cardboard boxes in front 
of you (we will use them later) 
Brown University   
November 14, 2009  
     Debra Kao, Undergraduate  
     Theo Page  
4 We start by selecting 2 monitors (the selection depends on what seat you 
chose).  The monitors will verify that the instructions are exactly followed 
and will be in charge of the information flow, as explained below.   
 
The monitors have a responsible and essential role, as will become clear 
in the experiment. Each monitor will be paid $20. 
 
Now that everyone is seated, untape the paper on your desk.  If the letter 
A or C is written on the other side of the paper, you have been selected 
to be a monitor.  
Monitors 
5 Please listen carefully to the instructions, which are to help you 
understand the experiment.  In the experiment itself, you will be 
reminded of each step, but with less explanation. If you have questions 
of clarification, at the end of the instructions raise your hand, and we will 
come to your desk to answer your questions.   
   
We ask that you do not talk, at all.  Please turn off cell phones, 
computers and other electronic devices. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
6 Participants who are seated on this side of the room will have the role of 
“Red” and will be referred to as “Red” or “Reds.”  Each Red will be given 
a yellow highlighter. 
 
Participants who are seated on this side of the room will have the role of 
“Blue” and will be referred to as “Blue” or “Blues.”  Each Blue will be given 
a black ink pen. 
 
Each Red participant will be randomly paired with a Blue participant  
(and each Blue participant will be paired with a Red participant). 
 
You won’t know the identity of the person you will be paired with,  
and the other person won’t know your identity, either. 
 
In this experiment you will make one single decision and the  
person you will be paired with will make one single decision.   
 
The two decisions will determine a location in a diagram.  The location  
will determine your payment and the payment to the person you are  
paired with. {Subjects in the Trapezoid game read the above 2 sentences 
                     and the next 7 slides.}   7 The diagram is a trapezoid with a green triangle in it.  The dots are 
possible locations.  The possible locations are intersections of the grid in 
the green triangle or on its boundary. 
Red will make a decision on how high or low the location will be. 
Blue will make a decision on how far to the left or right the location will 
be in the triangle.  The two decisions determine the location. 
The Diagram and Possible Locations 
8 Red can choose any horizontal grid line.  It could be the top grid line, 
the bottom grid line, or any of the other grid lines in between.  
Red’s Decision 
9 In this example, Red chooses the line as shown below.  Red indicates 
his or her choice by highlighting the chosen line with a yellow 
highlighter.  
The above is only an example.  The actual decision is made by each person. 
Red’s Decision 
10 Blue can choose any dot on the yellow line that Red chose.  On the 
yellow line, Blue can choose the left most dot, the right most dot, or any 
dot in between.  Note there are no dots outside of the green triangle.  
Blue’s Decision 
11 Continuing the example, Blue’s chooses the dot as shown below.  Blue 
indicates her or his decision by using a black ink pen to circle the chosen dot.  
Red’s and Blue’s decisions together determine the chosen location,  
The location is indicated by the circled dot in the example. 
Blue’s Decision 
12 If you are Red, your payment is the horizontal distance from the 
chosen location to the Red Sideline.   
If you are Blue, your payment is the horizontal distance from the  
chosen location to the Blue Sideline. 
Payments 
13 The horizontal distances are measured in grid widths.  In the example 
there are 9 grid widths from the chosen dot to Red’s Sideline. Each grid 
width is worth $1.  So in the example Red’s payment is $9. 
In the example there are15 grid widths from the chosen dot to Blue’s 
Sideline, and Blue’s payment is $15. 
Payments 
14 In the above example from the uninterpreted  Trapezoid game 
Red’s action was to choose the third line from the top and Blue’s 
action was to circle the second dot to the left.  With these decisions 
Red’s payment was $9 and Blue’s payment was $15.  
 
Next we consider the interpreted  BDM-like’s game form and an 
example from the BDM-like game.      
 
{No subject participated in more than one game or session.  
Subjects in the BDM-like game read the next 7 slides.}   
15 Each Red and Blue participant is given $10 as a show-up fee. 
Show-Up Fees and Decisions 
Each Red participant is given the opportunity to send some, all, or none 
of his/her show-up fee to an anonymous Blue participant. 
The experimenter matches, twice over, the amount Red sends, and Blue 
receives the tripled amount. 
Then Blue is given the opportunity to send back to the anonymous Red 
participant some, all, or none of the amount that Blue received. 
16 Red and Blue indicate their decisions on a decision sheet, as shown 
below. 
The Decision Sheet 
17 As an example, Red decides to send $2 to Blue (and Red keeps the 
remaining $8 of the show-up fee).  Red fills in the $2 bubble. 
An Example: Red’s Decision 
18 The experimenter triples the $2 to $6 and Blue receives the $6.  The 
experimenter fills in the $6 bubble. 
Continuing the Example: The Experimenter Triples 
19 Blue cannot send back more than the amount that Blue received.  The 
experimenter shows this limit by drawing the crossed-out rectangle. 
Continuing the Example: Experimenter Shows Limit 
20 Continuing the Example: Blue’s Decision 
In the example, Blue decides to send back to Red $1 (and Blue keeps the 
remaining $5 of the $6 amount Blue received).  Blue fills in the $1 bubble. 
21 The Example Continued: The Money Outcomes 
22 In the BDM-like game Red’s action was to send $2 to Blue and Blue’s action 
was to send back $1.   
 
In the Trapezoid example Red’s action was to choose a line and Blue’s action 
was to choose a dot.   
 
The actions differ but Red’s payment of $9 was the same in the Trapezoid 
example as it was in the BDM-like example.  Similarly, Blue’s payment of $15 
was the same in the two games. 
 
The two games differ, one uninterpreted the other interpreted, and differ 
between spatial or word-based forms. The examples show that the subjects’ 
actions can vary but have the same payments.   
 
{The next 3 slides are nearly identical in both the Trapezoid and BDM-like 
games and illustrate the constancy.} 
23 This is a “double blind” experiment. 
 
We have structured the experiment so that the experimenters and 
monitors will not learn who made what decision.  Following a fairly 
simple procedure we will be able to make the correct payments without 
knowing your identity as a decision maker. 
 
To make your and others’ decisions private we ask you and others:  
 
   (1) Not to tell your decision to others  
   (2) To take care to block the view of your highlight  or circle* from 
         others when you make your decision. 
 
If you and others follow these steps, you will experience an experiment 
on private decision making. 
 
_____________ 
*In the BDM-like game, the words “highlight or circle” are replaced by 
“decision sheet.” 
Privacy 
24 In this experiment, getting the correct payments while preserving privacy 
is made possible by using “claim checks.”  Here is the idea: 
Claim Checks 
If you go to a museum, you may give your coat to a “coat check” person.  
The check person sometimes has specially printed tickets, each with a 
number at the top, the same number at the bottom, and perforated in the 
middle.  The check person tears a ticket and gives you the top half of it 
and keeps the bottom half, which is attached to your coat.  When you are 
ready to leave, you give your half of the ticket to the check person.  The 
check person finds the coat with the matching number on the bottom half 
of the ticket, and gives you your coat.  There is no confusion over which 
coat to return, because the matching number on each half of your ticket 
differs from the number on any other ticket. 
25 The claim checks in this experiment differ from the example in some ways: 
Claim Checks 
Second, for most claim checks, the numbers are prominently displayed.  
Your claim check envelopes are sealed until the end of the experiment. 
But like other claim check systems, your claim check number differs 
from anyone else’s in the experiment. 
First, a claim check is not made up by a ticket torn in two halves.  Instead 
your claim check consists of two small envelopes with the same check 
number written inside each of the two envelopes.   
The experiment is structured so that when the claim check envelopes are 
opened they provide no information about your identity. 
26 Now for the specific steps of the experiment . . . 
 
(You don’t have to memorize the steps; we’ll 




  {Each subject in each game reads this slide and the next slide.} 
27 At the beginning of the experiment, the monitors bring a box of large 
envelopes to the Red participants and shuffle the envelopes. 
 
Each Red participant randomly picks a large envelope from the box. 
 
We call the large envelopes “carriers” because we use them to carry 
things around. 
Reds Randomly Pick Carriers 
28      The next slides are about operationalization.  
 
     In the Trapezoid game, from which the following slides are 
drawn, the slides show the trapezoid diagram and remind 
subjects how highlighting lines and circling dots determine 
payments. 
 
     In the BDM-like game, the slides show the decision sheet 
and how to make decisions by filling in the bubbles.   
 






   
29 The trapezoid diagram 
Two red envelopes (a) and (b) 
Do not unseal any envelopes until 
you are told to. 
Two blue envelopes (c) and (d) 
Carrier Contents 
Carrier Contents  
The contents of the carrier you picked 
are: 
30 Carrier Contents  First, open the carrier and put the small 
red envelope (a) in your pocket for safe 
keeping. It contains the top half of your 
claim check, and you will need it later to 
get your payment.   
If You Are a Red Participant, Your 
Actions and Decision Are: 
31 As a Red Participant, Your Actions 
and Decision Are: 
Second, take the trapezoid diagram out 
of the carrier and decide which 
horizontal grid line to choose.  Highlight 
your chosen line with the yellow 
highlighter. (We don’t show the yellow 
line, because it depends on your 
choice.) 
 
Later we will explain how you can make 
your decision private. 
Carrier Contents 
32 Third, put the diagram back in the carrier 
and make sure that the large envelopes 
(b) and (c) and the small envelope (d) 
are in the carrier.  Close the carrier. 
As a Red Participant, Your Actions 
and Decision Are: 
Carrier Contents 
33 After all the Reds make their decision 
the monitors collect the carriers and 
shuffle them.  
Monitors and Experimenters’ Actions 
The experimenters check the carriers 
and contents for problems.* 
The monitors shuffle the carriers and bring them  
to the Blues. 
__________________ 
* Among other things, the experimenters checked that no subject attempted to 
communicate information to his or her counterpart beyond the permitted highlighting 
of a line, circling of a dot, or filling in of a bubble.  The instructions stated: “CIearly 
indicate your decision.  Make no other marks on your decision sheet.  Make no 
marks on the envelopes or on the carrier. If your decision is not clear, or there are 
problems of marking envelopes, or the carrier, or its contents, then your decision may 
not be useable and you may be disqualified from receiving payment.”  These 
instructions were strictly followed, which safeguarded anonymity and ruled out 
transmission of suggestions or requests. 
 
34 Blue Participants Randomly  
Pick Carriers, Establishing Pairs 
With 16 Red and 16 Blue participants, 
some (anonymous) Blue participant will 
pick the carrier containing the decision of 
the (anonymous) participant we have 
been referring to as “you.” 
Each Blue participant randomly picks a 
carrier.  
This anonymous Red participant and this 
anonymous Blue participant are now 
paired for the rest of the experiment. 
35 Trapezoid diagram   
One large red envelope (b)  
Carrier Contents 
Do not unseal any envelopes until 
you are told to. 
Two blue envelopes (c) and (d) 
Carrier Contents  
The contents of the carrier you, the 
Blue participant, picked are: 
36 Blue’s Action 
First, open the carrier.  As the Blue 
participant of the pair, put the small 
blue envelope (d) in your pocket for 
safe keeping. You will need it later to 
get your payment. 
Carrier Contents 
37 Blue’s Actions and Information  
Carrier Contents  Second, take the trapezoid diagram out 
of the carrier and learn of Red’s 
decision from the yellow highlight. 
(Red’s choice of a yellow line is not 
shown in this slide because the chosen 
line depends on Red’s choice). 
38 Blue’s Actions, Information and Decision  
Carrier Contents  Third, you make a decision of which dot 
to choose on the yellow line.  You 
indicate your choice by a circle.  (Your 
choice is not shown in this slide because 
it depends on Red’s and your decision). 
 
Later we will explain how you can make 
your decision private. 
39 Blue’s Actions, Information and Decision  
Fourth, put the diagram back in the carrier 
and make sure envelopes (b) and (c) are 
in the carrier.  Close the carrier. 
Carrier Contents 
40 After Blues make their decisions, the 
monitors collect the carriers, shuffle them, 
and deliver them to the experimenters.  
The Experimenters’ and Monitors’ 
Actions and Information  
The monitors watch the experimenters 
open the carriers one by one, check for 
problems, and unseal and discard 
envelopes (b) and (c).  Inside are white 
payment envelopes to which the sealed 
bottom halves of Red’s and Blue’s claim 
checks were stapled before the 
experiment began. 
The experimenters use the trapezoid 
diagram and Red’s and Blue’s decisions 
(not shown in this slide) to find the 
correct cash amounts to place in each 
payment envelope.  
Carrier Contents 
41 Experimenters’ and Monitors’ Actions  
The monitors put the payment 
envelopes for Reds and Blues in 
separate piles.  The bottom halves of 
the claim checks remain sealed and 
stapled to the payment envelopes.  
The monitors unseal the bottom 
halves of the claim checks for Reds at 
one table, and for Blues at another 
table.  The payment envelopes remain 
sealed.  
Carrier Contents 
The experimenters record the decisions 
of each anonymous pair of participants, 
put the amounts in the payment 
envelopes, and seal these envelopes. 
42 The Experimenters’ and Monitors’ 
Actions and Information  
Because of the shuffling, the 
experimenters and monitors do not 
know the amount in anyone’s payment 
envelope. Privacy is preserved at the 
same time as the correct payments are 
made. 
The monitors ask participants, one by 
one, to produce from their pockets the 
top half of their claim check.   
The monitors find the bottom half of the 
claim check that matches the top half.  
With the bottom half stapled to the 
payment envelope, the correct payment 
is delivered to each of the participants. 
Carrier Contents 
43      Near the end of the instructions we included four practice exercises to 
ensure the subjects understood the instructions, then an experimenter began 
the “for keeps” part of the experiment by reading a script to remind the 
monitors and subjects of each step required of them, this time without 
practice exercises.  An experimental session took 60 to 80 minutes, including 
the payments.  Thirty-two subjects participated in each experimental session, 
not counting the monitors.* 
     To reduce the amount of talk about trust games, we scheduled gaps 
between the games.  We scheduled the Trapezoid game (or experiment) for 
November 14, 2009, close to Thanksgiving and travel time. We scheduled the 
BDM-like experiment for December 6, 2009 when the subjects were finishing 
the semester.  Since the 64 subjects playing the Blue and Red roles on Nov. 
14 and the 64 playing the corresponding roles on Dec. 6 were drawn from a 
general student population numbering about 6,000, it seems very unlikely that 
any subject in the BDM-like game (or experiment) arrived with detailed 
knowledge about the Trapezoid game played by an earlier subject, and all but 
certain that any such word-of-mouth was limited to a handful of individuals 
at most.  It is even less likely that Trapezoid treatment subjects had 
encountered the conventional, word-based trust game elsewhere, so their 
likelihood of associating the game we asked them to play with the one played 
in BDM (1995) would be very small.   
_______________________ 
* Thirty-two subjects  participated in each of the 6 sessions, but in one session a subject 
misplaced one of her envelopes, invalidating her and her counterpart’s data. 
  44 Figure 1.  Observed Outcomes  
     In the  Trapezoid game, 12 Reds sent $10, the maximum a Red can send. 
     Another 11 Reds send $0, the minimum a Red can send. 
      
     In the BDM-like game, 19 Reds sent $10,  the maximum a Red can send. 
     Another 2 Reds sent $0, the minimum a Red can send.    
45 The Correspondence Relation  
  
    The Trapezoid game varies from the BDM-like game in two ways: 
interpretation and form.   
     A subject in the Trapezoid game learns the game form with its circles, dots, 
and payment structure, but not the interpretation of the game.     
     A subject in the BDM-like game learns the BDM-like game form with its 
bubbles, payment structure and interpretation in terms of send, etc. 
     The subjects only observe one game or the other, and do not observe the 
variations.  Seeing both games, the experimenters can see the variations and 
identify a correspondence relation. Consider an example at the beginning in the 
Trapezoid game: Red’s decision was to choose the third line down (p. 10).  In 
response Blue chose the second dot to the right on Red’s chosen line (page 12).  
In result, Red’s payment is $9 and Blue’s payment is $15 (p. 14). 
     Now consider an example at the beginning in the BDM-like game.  Red’s 
decision was to send $2 (p. 18).  Blue sends back $1 (p. 21).  In result, Red’s 
payment is $9 and Blue’s payment is $15 (p. 22). It is straight-forward to check 
that for any Red and Blue decision in the Trapezoid game there is a unique Red 
and Blue decision in the BDM-like game with the same Red and Blue payments 
(and for any Red and Blue decision in the BDM-like game there is a unique Red 
and Blue decision in the Trapezoid game with the same Red and Blue payments).  
Thus it is possible to translate from lines and dots to “send” and “send back” as 
we did in Figure 1.  
      
 
 
     In the BDM-like game, with possibly value laden words, there are 19 cases of 
maximum trust. 
  
    Does this suggest that value laden words have an effect on behavior?  Is the 
difference in the small number of cases statistically significant? 
  
    The BDM-like game used the words of  “show up fee” (possibly suggesting 
entitlement), “send” and “send back” (possibly suggesting reciprocity), and 
“each dollar sent … will be tripled” (possibly suggesting the experimenters want 
the money to be sent).  
 
     In contrast, in the Trapezoid game we know for sure that the above words will 
not increase reciprocity or have other effects for the simple reason that the above 
words are completely absent in the Trapezoid game. 
 
     These and other differences between Trapezoid and BDM-like games provide 
a way of testing for the effects of the possibly suggestive meanings that are the 
basis of the doubts we started with.    
46 The Correspondence Relation and the Two Variables 
 
     The correspondence relation shows a similarity between the Trapezoid game 
and the BDM-like game (the correspondence also extends to the original BDM 
trust game).  Nonetheless, the two design “variations” – interpreted or 
uninterpreted and spatial or word-based  –  may lead to differences in behavior. 
 
       Spatial games are often uninterpreted and useful when there are questions 
about an interpreted game, which is our situation, and we designed the Trapezoid 
game as an uninterpreted spatial game. In contrast the BDM-like game is 
interpreted and is not spatial.  
47 Recall Two Observations in Figure 1 and Two Questions 
12 cases of maximum trust in the Trapezoid game and  
19 cases of maximum trust in the BDM-like game 
  
    Does this suggest that value laden words have an effect on behavior?  Is the 
difference in the small number of cases statistically significant? 
  
    The BDM-like game used the words “show up fee” (possibly suggesting 
entitlement), “send” and “send back” (possibly suggesting reciprocity), and 
“each dollar sent … will be tripled” (possibly suggesting the experimenters 
want the money to be sent).  
 
     In contrast, in the Trapezoid game we know for sure that the above words 
will not increase reciprocity or have other effects for the simple reason that 
the above words are completely absent in the Trapezoid game. 
 
     These and other differences between the Trapezoid and BDM-like games 
provide a way of testing for the effects of the possibly suggestive meanings 
that are the basis of the doubts we started with.   
48  
The Fisher Exact Test 
 
     The Fisher exact test has advantages: It works with small data sets,  is 
based on an exact calculation (not an approximation or an asymptote), and  
apparently was the genesis of p-values.  For many years the National Cancer 
Institute used the Fisher exact test to evaluate the toxicity of chemicals, e.g. by 
exposing a treated group of rats to a possibly toxic chemical while a control 
group, kept under otherwise identical conditions, was not exposed to it.   
      The qualitative results reported below – that is, whether particular 
differences are statistically significant at the 1% level, at the 10% level, or at 
neither of those levels – hold also for the chi-square and other tests.   
     We used one-tailed tests because it appears that the possibly value laden 
words would either increase the effect on the words or would have no effect at 
all.  It also appears that the effect of transparency and neutrality would be 
minor or none in respect to the words. 
      Each of the four 2x2 tables in Figure 2 provides a step toward resolving or 
confirming the doubts we started with. We refer to each table by its first row 
heading. 
49 [ 
50              “Max trust of $10,”  Trapezoid Game 
 
     The left column of the Max trust table shows decisions about “maximum 
trust” made by subjects in the Trapezoid game.   
     The top of the left column shows the number 12, which is the number of Reds 
in the Trapezoid game who decided to highlight the lowest line in the Trapezoid 
diagram (or each of 12 Reds “sent” $10 each to an anonymous Blue).   
     The bottom of the left column shows the number 19, the number of Reds in 
the Trapezoid game who decided not to highlight the lowest line in the Trapezoid 
diagram (or each of 19 Reds did not “send” $10 to an anonymous Blue).   
     Reds who highlighted the lowest line trusted the most, and could end up with 
a payment of $0 when they could have had a guaranteed payment of $10; Reds 
who did not highlight the lowest line guaranteed their payment would be at least 
more than $0.   
     No subject was exposed to the possibly value laden words “show-up fee,” 
“send,” “send back,” or “each dollar sent … will be tripled” which are absent in 
the Trapezoid game.  “Trust” and “guarantee” are used in this commentary but 
absent in the two games.  In this sense, the Trapezoid game acts as a Control.  
     Possibly in the Trapezoid game some subjects had the strategic idea, rightly or 
wrongly, that giving the generous maximum would elicit enough reciprocity to 
make it worthwhile.  Or some subjects anticipated the feeling of well-being from 
oxytocin.  Or some subjects brought their values to the lab, including  trust.  Such 
motivations might explain some of the observed behavior (that is, the behavior of 
the 12 Reds who sent the maximum amount, or the behavior of the 19 Reds who 
sent less or maybe nothing).     51                “Max trust of $10,” BDM-like Game 
 
     The right column of the table shows decisions about “maximum trust” made 
by subjects in the BDM-like game.   
     The top of the right column shows the number 19, which is the number of Reds 
in the BDM-like game who decided to fill in the highest bubble available ($10) 
for Reds in the BDM-like game.  
     The bottom of the right column shows the number 13, which is the number of 
Reds in the BDM-like game who each decided to not send his/her entire money 
available ($10) to an anonymous Blue; these Reds guaranteed their payment 
would be at least more than $0.  
     The 19 Reds in the BDM-like game who sent the most ($10) trusted the most; 
these 19 Reds could end up with a payment of $0 when they could have 
guaranteed themselves $10. 
      In the BDM-like game every subject was exposed to the possibly value laden 
words.  In this sense, the BDM-like game acts as a Treatment, in respect to the 
words.  
     In addition to the Treatment with words, the same motivations operating in 
the Trapezoid Game (i.e., the strategic idea and anticipated well-being from 
oxytocyn), might explain some trusting also in the BDM-like game.  
52                   “Max trust of $10,” Comparison 
 
     In the Trapezoid game the frequency of Reds choosing maximum trust was  
12/(12+19) = 0.39.   
 
     In the BDM-like game the frequency of Reds choosing maximum trust was 
19/(19+13) = 0.59.   
 
     The difference in frequencies between 0.39 without the words in the 
Trapezoid game, and 0.59 with the words in the BDM-like game is significant 
(p-value 0.082). 
   
     This difference in frequency suggests that the value laden words had an 
effect in increasing the number of subjects giving the maximum $10. 
53  “Iterated Dominance,”  Trapezoid Game 
 
     The left column shows decisions about “Iterated Dominance” made by subjects in 
the Trapezoid game. 
     The top of the left column shows the number 11, which is the number of Reds in 
the Trapezoid game who decided to highlight the highest line in the Trapezoid 
diagram (at the top of the triangle).  This is the case of Iterated Dominance in the 
game in which Blue has no decision to make (there is only one dot at the top of the 
triangle for Blue to choose from).  In Figure 1 (p. 45), a case of Iterated Dominance 
is shown as a circle on the horizontal axis with a dot on the axis and square also on 
the horizontal axis (this means a Red sends $0 to Blue), and Red and Blue each get 
$10 equally.     
     The bottom of the left column shows the number 20, the number of Reds in the 
Trapezoid game who decided not to highlight the highest line in the Trapezoid 
diagram.  These are not cases of Iterated Dominance.  A Red who sent $10 to a Blue 
takes a risk.  If Blue sends $20 back, then Red and Blue each end up with $20 (there 
were two cases of that, shown by cases 1 and 2, with the squares signifying equality 
at the $20 mark).  But if Blue sends back $0, Red gets $0 and Blue gets $40 (there 
were 6 cases of that outcome, see cases 7-12).   
54   “Iterated Dominance,”  Trapezoid Game (cont.) 
 
     It is well-known that spatial games tend to be value neutral and transparent.  For 
example, in the Trapezoid game it was easy to visualize payments as distances.  It was 
also easy to explain the Trapezoid game without using the words “send,” “send back,” 
“show-up fee,” and “triple.”  Up until now we have focused on the absence of such 
words in the Trapezoid game in its role as a Control. 
     We now consider how the Trapezoid game’s characteristics of  neutrality and 
transparency related to Iterated Dominance.  We find that a Blue can easily see that 
his/her best (monetary) strategy is to circle the left-most dot, whatever line Red 
chooses.  Realizing this, Red’s best (monetary) strategy is to choose the top line.  That 
is, it is easy for a Red to see Iterated Dominance as a solution concept.   
     As already noted, when a Red chooses the top line, Red ensures a case of Iterated 
Dominance, because when Red chooses the top line Blue has no decision to make.  In 
our  example when Red forces Iterated Dominance, Red avoids considerable risk and 
assures a guaranteed outcome to herself and less benefit for Blue.      
     The 11 cases of Iterated Dominance are not surprising in light of the Trapezoid 
game’s transparency and moral neutrality (and simplicity of this version of Iterated 
Dominance). 
55 “Iterated Dominance,”  BDM-Like Game  
 
     The right column shows decisions about “Iterated Dominance” made by subjects 
in the BDM-like game. 
     The top of the right column shows the number 2, which is the number of Reds in 
the BDM-like game who decided to fill the bubble labeled 0.  This is the case of  
Iterated Dominance in the game in which Blue has no decision to make.  In Figure 1, 
a case of Iterated Dominance is shown as a circle on the horizontal axis with a dot on 
the axis and square also on the horizontal axis (this means a Red sends $0 to Blue), 
and Red and Blue each get $10 equally.  This works via the correspondence relation.     
     The bottom of the right column shows the number 30, the number of Reds in the 
BDM-like game who decided to fill a bubble which is Not 0. 
56 “Iterated Dominance,” Comparison 
  
The 11 cases of Iterated Dominance in the Trapezoid game compared with 
the    2  cases of Iterated Dominance in the BDM-like game is not very surprising.  
The characteristics of  neutrality and transparency are more salient in the Trapezoid 
game than in the BDM-like game. 
 
Trapezoid frequency of Reds choosing Iterated Dominance  was 11/(11+20) = 0.35. 
BDM-like frequency of Reds choosing Iterated Dominance  was    2/(2+30)  = 0.06.  
 
This difference in frequencies between the Trapezoid and BDM-like games is 
significant (p-value 0.004).  
 
57  “Reciprocity1,”  Trapezoid Game 
 
     The left column of the table shows decisions about “Reciprocity1” made by 
subjects in the Trapezoid game. 
     The top of the left column shows 11, the number of cases of Reciprocity1.  
     The bottom of the left column shows 9, the number of cases of Not Reciprocity1. 
     Note that the sum of the cases of Reciprocity1 plus Not Reciprocity1 is 20,  
because 11 Blues could not make a decision due to the 11 cases of iterated dominance  
(and the disqualified pair, from the missing envelope in the Trapezoid game).  
 
     The definition of Reciprocity1 is shown in Figure 1.  Restated, a case of 
Reciprocity1 happens when an anonymous Red has sent a positive amount to a Blue 
and Blue sends back as much or more than the paired Red sent to Blue.  (For example, 
if Red sends Blue $5 and Blue sends back $8, then this is a case of Reciprocity1.  If  
Red sends Blue $8 and Blue sends back $5, then this is not a case of Reciprocity1.) 
 
     In the Trapezoid game, No subject was exposed to the possibly value laden words 
“show-up fee,” “send,” “send back,” or “each dollar sent … will be tripled,” these 
words are absent in the Trapezoid game. In this sense, the Trapezoid game acts as a 
Control.  
     With 11 cases of Reciprocity1 and 9 cases of Not reciprocity1, the frequency of 
Reciprocity1 is 11/(11+9) = 0.55,  meaning that Blues reciprocated (Reciprocity1) in a 
little more than half the cases in which Blue could make a decision. 
58         “Reciprocity1,”  BDM-like Game  
 
     The right column of the table shows decisions about “Reciprocity1” made by 
subjects in the BDM-like game. 
     The top of the left column shows 15, the number of cases of Reciprocity1.  
     The bottom of the left column shows 15, the number of cases of Not 
Reciprocity1. 
     Note that the sum of the cases of Reciprocity1 plus Not Reciprocity1 is 30,  
because 2 Blues could not make a decision due to the 2 cases of iterated 
dominance).  
  
     The definition of Reciprocity1 is the same as in the previous slide.  
      
     In the BDM-like game, Every subject was exposed to the possibly value laden 
words and in the BDM-like game the words act as a Treatment.   
     With 15 cases of Reciprocity1 and 15 cases of Not reciprocity1, the frequency 
of reciprocity is 15/(15+15) = 0.50,  meaning that Blues reciprocated 




59              “Recipocity1,” Comparison  
  
     In the Trapezoid game there were: 11 cases of Reciprocity1 and 9 cases of Not 
Reciprocity1, with a frequency 11/(11+9) = 0.55.  
 
     In the BDM-like game there were: 15 cases of Reciprocity1 and 15 cases of Not 
reciprocity1, with a frequency15/(15+15) = 0.50. 
 
     The difference in frequencies between 0.55 without the words in the Trapezoid game, 
and 0.50 with the words in the BDM-like game is insignificant (p-value 0.477). 
 
     This negative finding suggests that the possibly value laden words in the lab have 
little or no effect on reciprocity (Reciprocity1). 
 
     Note that we found evidence that possibly value laden words have an effect in 
increasing the number of subjects giving the maximum $10.  And now we find evidence 
that, under different circumstances, words have little or no effect.       
 
60 “Reciprocity2,”  Trapezoid Game  
 
     The left column of the table shows decisions about “Reciprocity2” made by 
subjects in the Trapezoid game. 
     The top of the left column shows 11, the number of cases of Reciprocity2.  
     The bottom of the left column shows 9, the number of cases of Not Reciprocity2. 
     Note that the sum of the cases of Reciprocity2 plus Not Reciprocity2 is 20,  
because 11 Blues could not make a decision due to the 11 cases of iterated 
dominance  (and the disqualified pair, from the missing envelope in the Trapezoid 
game).  
 
     In a more lenient definition of reciprocity, a case of Reciprocity2 “happens when 
an anonymous Red has sent a positive amount to a Blue and Blue sends back as 
much or more than the paired Red sent to Blue.”  (For example, if Red sends Blue 
$8 and Blue sends back $5, then this is a case of Reciprocity2.  If  Red sends Blue 
$8 and Blue sends back $0, then this is not a case of Reciprocity2.) 
 
     In the Trapezoid game, No subject was exposed to the possibly value laden 
words.  In this sense, the Trapezoid game acts as a Control.  
     With 11 cases of Reciprocity2 and 9 cases of Not Reciprocity2, the frequency of 
reciprocity is 11/(11+9) = 0.55,  meaning that Blues reciprocated (Reciprocity2) in 
a little more than half the cases in which Blue could make a decision.   
61 “Reciprocity2,”  BDM-like Game  
 
     The right column of the table shows decisions about “Reciprocity2” made by 
subjects in the BDM-like game. 
     The top of the right column shows 20, the number of cases of Reciprocity2.  
     The bottom of the right column shows 10, the number of cases of Not 
Reciprocity2. 
 
     The definition of Reciprocity2 is the same as in the previous slide.  
      
     In the BDM-like game, Every subject was exposed to the possibly value laden 
words and in the BDM-like game the words act as a Treatment.   
     With 20 cases of Reciprocity2 and 10 cases of Not Reciprocity2, the frequency 
of reciprocity is 20/(20+10) = 0.67,  meaning that Blues reciprocated 
(Reciprocity2) in two-thirds the cases in which Blue could make a decision.* 
 
______________________________  
* Note that among Trapezoid game subjects, no Blue subject satisfied 
Reciprocity2 without also satisfying Reciprocity1, so the numbers on the left sides 
of both tables are the same.  The same is not true, however, for BDM-like game 




62  “Recipocity2,” Trapezoid & BDM-like (comparison)  
  
     In the Trapezoid game there were: 11 cases of Reciprocity2 and 9 cases of Not 
Reciprocity2, with a frequency 11/(11+9) = 0.55.  
 
     In the BDM-like game there were: 20 cases of Reciprocity2 and 10 cases of Not 
Reciprocity2, with a frequency 20/(20+10) = 0.67. 
 
     The difference in frequencies between 0.55 without the words in the Trapezoid game, 
and 0.67 with the words in the BDM-like game is insignificant (p-value 0.220). 
 
     This negative finding suggests that the possibly value laden words in the lab have 
little or no effect on reciprocity (Reciprocity2). 
 
     Note that using Reciprocity2 we found slightly less negative evidence that the words 
have little or no effect.*   
 
__________________________          
* Possibly the presence of the words “send back” help to account for the presence of 5 
cases in which Blue sent back a small positive amount in the BDM-like game versus the 
absence of such cases in the Trapezoid game.   
 
63  
Results and Conclusions   
 
     Could the language of “send,” “send back” be the source of reciprocal behavior in 
trust games?  Could efforts to achieve double-blind anonymity be a source of 
interpretation (eg.“it’s okay to be selfish” or “the experimenters want us to act 
selfishly”)? 
     We wanted to design an experimental trust game that was uninterpreted or nearly so.  
This quest took us four years, not long for an experiment, but down paths that surprised 
us. 
 
     (1) Our evidence does not support the conjecture that “social” behaviors are present 
in the trust game solely because they are induced by verbal cues.  See pp.  51, 53, 54, 
55, 57, 58, 60, 61, 63. 
     (2) Evidence of the effect of value laden words, compared to without the words, in 
pp. 50 – 53.  Max trust of $10. 
     (3) Evidence of neutrality and transparency in pp. 50 and 54 – 57.  Iterated 
Dominance. 
     (4) Evidence of the possibly value laden words, having little or no effect on 
reciprocity in pp. 50 and 58 – 63.  Recipocity1 & Recipocity2.  
64 Contributions that Made the Results Possible  
 
     (a) The design of the Trapezoid game compared with the BDM-like game.  And 
more generally uninterpreted spatial games.  
 
     (b) The design of a double-blind procedure, simple and symmetric, based on claim 
checks. 
 
     (c) The correspondence relation. 
 
     (d) Iterated dominance as a solution concept. 
 
     (e) Increased use of graphics, as a research tool. 
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